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 Applying Administrative Law Principles To Hydraulic 
Fracturing 
Joel M. Pratt* 
Introduction 
The practice of hydraulic fracturing—or fracking—has become a major 
focus of policymakers in recent years. Federal, state, and local regulations on 
fracking create a confusing web for industry to navigate, and governmental 
entities often battle with each other for authority to regulate the practice. 
The fast and widespread growth of fracking in the United States has 
therefore exacerbated confusion over who will regulate this booming 
industry, and courts have so far failed to use sensible principles to resolve 
inconsistencies among federal, state, and local regulations. 
When fracking laws conflict, courts traditionally use preemption 
doctrine—general rules that help judges choose whether state or local laws 
(or both) should apply in particular situations—to resolve these conflicts. 
Yet this doctrine has produced confusion and regulatory uncertainty.1 
This Essay advocates a different approach. Because regulators and 
industry need both legal clarity and the ability to react to new information, 
courts should apply principles of administrative deference to resolve 
conflicts between state and local fracking regulations. Administrative 
deference refers to a set of principles that privileges administrative decision 
making over judicial discretion in areas of statutory ambiguity. Under these 
principles, courts weigh expert agency decision making more heavily when 
the agency has acted reasonably. When faced with a conflict between state 
and local fracking laws, courts should adopt administrative principles and 
privilege expert agency regulations rather than engage in an independent 
judicial inquiry. Part I provides background on fracking and argues that 
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of this Essay. I am also grateful to Robert Manhas and Samuel Leifer of the Michigan Law 
Review Notes Office for their extremely helpful edits and to Marcel Rosner, Matthew 
McCurdy, and Brian Tengel for their encouragement and invaluable feedback throughout this 
process. I would also like to thank Rebecca Schnee and my parents for their unceasing support. 
 1. Compare Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 
Boulder Cnty. July 24, 2014) (striking down a local fracking ban), with Wallach v. Town of 
Dryden, 23 N.Y.3d 728 (2014) (upholding a local fracking ban). 
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states are in the best position to regulate the practice. Part II then explores 
the difference between preemption doctrine and administrative deference, 
ultimately concluding that state courts should defer to state agency decisions 
on fracking regulation. 
I. Background on Fracking, Its Risks, and the Law 
Simply put, fracking is just what it sounds like: energy extractors blast 
high volumes of water, mixed with chemicals, at shale formations in order to 
fracture the shale rock, which stimulates oil and gas production. By 
producing energy, fracking supports the American economy and promotes 
energy independence, but these benefits come with risks to the environment. 
Environmental groups allege that fracking causes pollution, particularly to 
water sources.2 These groups are right: by opening up unprecedented 
sources of natural-gas production and increasing the number of wells in 
operation, fracking has indeed created more pollution.3 The standard risks 
associated with other forms of energy production, such as risks of well blow-
outs, pipeline explosions, and oil spills, compound these potential harms. 
Given that the widespread use of fracking is relatively new, however, the 
scientific and legal communities remain uncertain about its real impact.4 
Regardless of this uncertainty, fracking’s benefits, coupled with its potential 
risks, demonstrate that a regulatory response is necessary. The federal 
government cannot reasonably be expected to regulate fracking, however, 
and local laws fail to do so properly. This leaves state governments, which 
are democratically responsive and capable of developing the expertise 
needed to regulate fracking. 
A.  The Federal Government Does Not and Will Not Regulate Fracking 
As it stands, federal law does not regulate fracking because one of the 
key federal provisions protecting water sources from drilling activity 
 
 2. See, e.g., Risky Gas Drilling Threatens Health, Water Supplies, NATURAL RES. 
DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/energy/gasdrilling/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
 3. See generally ELIZABETH RIDLINGTON & JOHN RUMPLER, FRACKING BY THE 




 4. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA BARKLEY ET AL., POSITIVES, NEGATIVES, UNCERTAINTY, 
AND OPINIONS ON HYDROFRACTURING IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.gov.allconet.org/pr/FRACKING%20RESEARCH%20PAPER%20FINAL-5-27-
11.pdf; N.R. Goldstein, Op-Ed: Uncertainty Looms Over Fracking Debate, SAGE MAG., Sept. 
22, 2012, http://www.sagemagazine.org/op-ed-uncertainty-looms-over-fracking-debate/. 
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specifically exempts it.5 While some members of Congress have introduced 
the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (“FRAC”) Act—
an amendment to the Safe Drinking Water Act that would pull fracking back 
into the purview of federal regulators6—strong partisan divisions suggest 
that such an amendment is unlikely to pass. Even if the FRAC Act did pass, 
however, it would simply set minimum standards for state permitting 
requirements and would reserve a state’s right to seek primary enforcement 
power. Therefore, even under the best scenario for proponents of federal 
regulation, the states would have primary authority to regulate fracking. 
B.  Local Regulations Are Ineffective and Counterproductive 
Citizens, perhaps frustrated by a lack of federal action, have turned to 
local governments to enact laws that ban fracking.7 These local laws create 
uncertainty, waste resources, and make research more difficult. Moreover, 
many disputes over local laws shift too much authority to state courts.8 
Local fracking laws also create additional regulatory hurdles that 
companies must overcome. Because local laws supplement, rather than 
replace, state regulations, they impose additional burdens on drilling 
companies. Moreover, a local ordinance may be quickly and quietly passed 
after a company has already jumped through the bureaucratic hoops at the 
state level. Such an ordinance, even one that takes a drastic step like banning 
fracking entirely, could come into effect after a company has already made 
significant investments in a drilling operation.9 The burden of these 
regulations ought to be offset by corollary benefits. That is not the case, 
however. In fact, these local laws produce even more deleterious effects: they 
 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 6. S. 1135, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2013). 
 7. In Colorado, for example, citizens tried to place measures on the ballot that would 
vest more authority in the hands of regulators. See Jack Healy, Effort to Avoid Vote on 
Fracking Falters in Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2014, at A12, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/us/effort-to-avoid-vote-on-fracking-falters-in-
colorado.html. Though a compromise eventually avoided the vote on those measures, localities 
continue to regulate fracking. Lynn Bartels, Let’s Make a Deal: How Colorado Came to a 
Fracking Compromise, THE DENVER POST, Aug. 23, 2014, available at 
http://www.denverpost.com/election2014/ci_26394883/lets-make-deal-how-colorado-came-
fracking-compromise; Local Actions Against Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH, 
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/fracking/anti-fracking-map/local-action-documents/ 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2014). 
 8. See infra Section II.A. 
 9. For an example of the issues with local fracking bans and the lawsuits that 
accompany them, see Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 23 N.Y.3d 728 (2014), a case in which 
Norse Energy Corporation filed for bankruptcy while litigating against the city’s ban. 
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stand in the way of information gathering and create harmful economic 
incentives. 
To understand how local regulations impede important research, 
consider two states’ divergent approaches to regulating fracking. On the one 
hand, there is Texas, a notoriously under regulated state when it comes to 
fracking.10 The Railroad Commission of Texas’s Oil & Gas Division regulates 
some aspects of the fracking process.11 In addition, Texas gives a great deal of 
authority to local governments and erects barriers against state rule.12 
Michigan, on the other hand, has much stronger substantive state 
rules.13 Importantly, Michigan also grants localities much less authority to 
regulate. Not only does the state give an agency exclusive authority to 
regulate oil and gas wells14 but a separate law divests local governments of 
this authority.15 Michigan thus provides a useful comparison to Texas in 
determining how these two different regulatory structures affect the realities 
of fracking. 
A recent study, which monitored frackers’ violations of state law, 
provides a useful set of data.16 In Texas, the largest percentage of violations 
involved “[p]ermitting & reporting.”17 Notably, Texas reported no violations 
of its site-maintenance or surface-spill rules.18 Michigan, by contrast, had no 
violations of “[p]ermitting & reporting” but did report violations of both 
site-maintenance and surface-spill rules.19 
These data suggest that granting authority to local governments can 
create a regulatory web that prevents state agencies from discovering 
substantive problems with fracking. Texas is catching permitting problems 
but not the more substantial—and worrisome—violations of site-
maintenance and surface-spill rules that inevitably attend any fracking 
operation. Indeed, since it is extremely unlikely that there were none of these 
violations on the ground in Texas—after all, there were violations in every 
 
 10. See Jason Obold, Note, Leading by Example: The Fracturing Responsibility and 
Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011 as a Catalyst for International Drilling Reform, 23 
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 473, 485 (2012). 
 11. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3 (2013). 
 12. See DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA 401 (2000). 
 13. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 324.61505 (LexisNexis 2014). 
 14. Id. 
 15. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 125.3205 (LexisNexis 2014). 
 16. See Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 361, 374 (2012). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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other state studied—the reasonable conclusion is that Texas’s patchwork of 
local laws makes it considerably more difficult for the state agency to 
discover violations that pose significant environmental risks. As this example 
suggests, local rules can shift the focus of both companies and regulators to 
permitting and bureaucracy rather than safety and the environment. Given 
that scientific uncertainty remains a major problem for the industry,20 local 
rules stand in the way of safer, more environmentally conscious fracking. 
Local bans also create undesirable economic incentives that prevent 
well-informed regulation. Since shale rock does not respect political 
boundaries, a single drilling can simultaneously fracture shale in a number 
of different locations, perhaps in different municipal jurisdictions.21 Any 
harm to a water supply from this drilling can affect greater geographic areas 
than single cities, creating situations where one municipality may impose 
externalities on another.22 For example, City A may ban fracking, but 
neighboring City B may incentivize the same practice, pursuing the same gas 
deposit, which poses the same risks. City A then must live with the 
environmental impacts from City B’s activity while receiving none of the 
economic benefits. City A therefore has a strong incentive to pass legislation 
encouraging industry to drill in its municipality and ignore the 
environmental risks to City B. City A may even choose to ignore risks to its 
own municipality, since City B’s decision to incentivize fracking already 
causes it environmental harm that it cannot prevent. 
Nowhere in this set of decisions is there room for expert research and 
analysis. Instead, localities facing these choices will take one of two actions: 
(1) they will either ban the practice entirely, due to fear and political 
pressure;23 or (2) they will tear down barriers to fracking in order to create 
jobs and generate tax revenue. In places where fracking is banned, it will be 
impossible to collect safety-oriented data on fracking. Crucial research in 
these cities will grind to a halt. And in the localities that do not ban the 
practice, the incentives militate against strong regulations, particularly if one 
locality will reap all of the benefits but many will face the environmental 
 
 20. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 21. For an easy-to-understand geologic map of shale formations, see Big Reserves, Big 
Reservations, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2013, at 32, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21571899-california-tries-decide-if-it-wants-
join-shale-revolution-big-reserves-big. 
 22. For an example of how water systems may be interconnected over a large 
geographic area, see Tanya Foubert, Ground, Surface Water Interconnected: Expert, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN OUTLOOK (Aug. 1, 2013, 06:00 AM), 
http://www.rmoutlook.com/article/20130801/RMO0801/308019990/ground-surface-water-
interconnected-expert. 
 23. See Local Actions Against Fracking, supra note 7. 
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consequences. Thus, local governments lack the proper incentives to regulate 
fracking prudently and intelligently. 
C.  States: The Proper Fracking Police 
Across the country, the states generally have primary responsibility to 
regulate fracking,24 and their authority to do so should be protected. One 
significant advantage that a state enjoys over its constituent localities is that a 
state—due to its larger size—has more resources.25 For example, states can 
consult fracking experts on the practice’s risks. This is crucial: because 
regulatory uncertainty is a serious problem for fracking companies, expertise 
ought to drive decision making, not the whims of a fearful local population.26 
Drawing on its comparatively vast array of resources, an expert state agency 
can promulgate comprehensive safety regulations that reflect its informed 
determinations about the proper locations for drilling in a safe and efficient 
manner. No longer will the locality most willing to risk environmental harm 
dictate where drilling occurs. 
State-level control also has a distinct advantage over federal regulation. 
State experts can tailor rules for each state’s particular geological reality. 
Because state legislatures and agencies are more familiar with a state’s 
geographic landscape and the needs of its constituents, they can better 
research and understand local industry and environmental concerns than 
the federal government. Fracking in particular makes this advantage 
apparent: fracking’s environmental problems demand that legislatures are 
familiar with local landscapes in order to create effective legislation—
legislation that actually considers the land’s specific characteristics in 
balancing environmental and industry concerns. For example, Colorado’s 
approach to protecting mountain streams will no doubt be different from 
Michigan’s rules protecting the Great Lakes. Because state regulators better 
understand the nuances of their own geographic territory, they can better 
tailor regulations to account for on-the-ground problems. 
 
 24. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-101 to -130 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. 
§ 324.61505 (LexisNexis 2014); DAVE NESLIN, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: A COMPARISON OF 
REGULATORY APPROACHES AND TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE (2013), available at 
http://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/Neslin-2013-Internationa-Conference.pdf. 
 25. See generally J. RICHARD ARONSON & JOHN L. HILLEY, FINANCING STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (4th ed. 1986) (describing the funding sources for and functions of 
state and local governments). 
 26. See supra Section I.B for an explanation of why local governments have the wrong 
incentives to regulate fracking properly. 
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II. The Administrative Deference Principle Accords States Their Proper Role in 
Fracking Regulation 
The principle of administrative deference yields a better solution than 
preemption doctrine to competing local and state fracking regulations. In 
particular, when judges apply preemption doctrine, they follow general 
conflict-of-law principles and often reach confusing and unpredictable 
results. Administrative deference, by contrast, recognizes and implements 
tested principles of administrative law and therefore offers predictability to 
litigants and lawmakers. Section II.A explores in more depth the 
inadequacies of the preemption doctrine. Section II.B then argues that 
administrative law provides a better set of principles for resolving conflicts 
between state and local laws. 
A. Preemption Doctrine Inadequately Arbitrates State–Local Disputes 
State and local preemption cases relating to fracking regulations place 
the burden on state courts to determine whether state or local regulations 
apply. Preemption doctrines instruct that, when state courts are making this 
determination, they should tend to favor coregulation whenever possible, 
even in states with strong, effective state regulations.27 Under the preemption 
analysis, then, judges confronted with state–local regulatory clashes often 
hold in favor of coregulation rather than issuing sweeping rulings that 
preclude future local regulation.28 These rulings allow judges to avoid 
making decisions that have unintended consequences or that would require 
reversing long-standing precedent. The consequence of such a system is that 
every local ordinance may end up in court, and it then becomes a judicial 
 
 27. See, e.g., Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992) (setting out 
Colorado’s three-part preemption doctrine, which defers to local rules except when the issue is 
only of statewide importance); Addison Twp. v. Gout, 460 N.W.2d 215, 216 (Mich. 1990) 
(holding that the state’s “exclusive jurisdiction . . . does not extend to all aspects of the [oil and 
gas] production process”); City of Beaumont v. Fall, 291 S.W. 202, 206 (Tex. 1927) (“Of 
course, a general law and a city ordinance will not be held repugnant to each other if any other 
reasonable construction leaving both in effect can be reached.”). 
 28. See Voss, 830 P.2d at 1068 (holding that, although the Colorado state government 
has a sufficiently strong interest in regulation that overrides certain complete drilling bans, 
some aspects of oil and gas drilling can be coregulated by state and local governments); see 
also Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder Cnty. 
July 24, 2014) (addressing Voss and complex Colorado precedent on preemption and 
ultimately holding that state law preempts Longmont’s fracking ban). 
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task to pick and choose among regulations.29 Judges are not oil and gas 
experts, however, and they lack the democratic accountability of legislators 
and governors.30 The current system has provided state judges tremendous 
but ultimately unwarranted authority to regulate the fracking industry. 
In this crucial way, preemption doctrine is inadequate to adjudicate 
conflicts between state and local laws. The general conflict-of-law principles 
that judges rely on in using the preemption doctrine fail to address the vast 
differences between states and localities in terms of resources and access to 
expertise. Moreover, these principles do not actually constrain judicial 
discretion. Given the extremely divisive nature of environmental regulation, 
the courts should make decisions within reasonable doctrinal constraints 
because such decisions would better serve both environmental and industry 
needs. 
B. Administrative Deference Better Resolves State–Local Disputes 
Administrative law provides a better set of principles to resolve conflicts 
between state and local laws. In applying the administrative-deference 
principle, courts should first determine whether the agency has the authority 
to make the decision it made. Second, courts should determine whether the 
exercise of that authority was reasonable. 
The landmark case enunciating this principle and process is Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.31 In that case, the 
Supreme Court instructed federal courts to accord deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of law. The Court adopted this model in part because it found 
that expert agencies, which are tasked with administering complex statutes, 
are in a better position than courts to interpret those statutes.32 These 
specialized agencies have a particular subject-matter expertise, and they are 
often staffed by expert bureaucrats, not generalist judges. Recogizing their 
agencies’ expertise, many states have adopted some form of judicial 
 
 29. For a cogent explanation of how a few state courts have dealt with state–local 
conflicts in fracking regulations, see Keith B. Hall, Recent Developments in Hydraulic 
Fracturing Regulation and Litigation, 29 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2014). 
 30. Even in states where state judges face elections, such elections are less partisan and 
politicized, and judges rarely lose their seats. Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends 
1964-2006, 90 JUDICATURE 208, 210 (2007) (“In only 56 of the 6,306 judicial retention 
elections were judges not retained.”). 
 31. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 32. Id. at 865. 
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deference to agency decisions, often asking whether an agency’s exercise of 
authority was reasonable.33 
If a state legislature has delegated to an agency the task of regulating 
fracking, then local governments and state courts should defer to the 
agency’s authority to regulate. If a challenge is brought against a law that 
bans or severely restricts fracking, the courts should defer to the state 
agency’s judgment about fracking in that particular locality. After all, 
agencies are best equipped quickly to respond to changed circumstances 
because they are not bound by the same onerous procedures as legislatures. 
Moreover, in the face of uncertainty, agencies can conduct research on 
complex issues and change rules accordingly as new information becomes 
available. Given these advantages, state courts should adopt the Chevron 
principle and defer to state agencies’ decisions when those decisions are not 
capricious or beyond the agency’s statutory authority. 
There are two distinct advantages to applying this administrative law 
principle in the energy-development context. First, under this principle, state 
governments and energy-industry players can expect more certainty from 
state courts, which allows governments and industry to plan accordingly and 
allocate their resources more efficiently. Litigants will also benefit from this 
certainty, as they can expect the courts to rule in favor of state administrative 
rules. 
Second, administrative deference can help channel citizen and 
municipal concerns through the state administrative process. Instead of 
fighting court battles over whether state law should trump local law, citizens 
and municipalities can work through the administrative system to craft, 
refine, and apply rules in light of new technologies, safety innovations, and 
increasing awareness of the long-term effects of fracking. The statewide 
impacts of fracking—for example, its potential to harm water sources—are 
important enough to merit statewide regulation. Implementing robust 
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures on a statewide basis can give 
individuals ample opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process. State 
courts can still step in if the agency promulgates arbitrary rules or makes 
decisions outside the scope of its authority. Otherwise, state courts should 
respect agencies’ relative expertise and accord the proper deference. 
It should be noted that the administrative-deference principle does allow 
localities to play a role in cases where the state utterly fails to regulate. 
Opponents of an administrative-deference regime might argue that industry-
dominated states would be able to regulate weakly—or not at all. In this 
scenario, courts, deferring to state agency authority, would be forced to 
 
 33. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 
336 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2011); In re Rovas, 754 N.W.2d 259 (Mich. 2008); Wine & Spirits 
Wholesalers of Colo. v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 919 P.2d 894 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). 
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throw out local laws designed to fill significant gaps. Not so. In order to 
receive administrative deference from courts, state agencies must actually 
conduct research and promulgate rules in the first place; if agencies fail to do 
so, there are no rules to which courts can defer. Administrative deference 
preserves a role for local governments to regulate when the state fails. This 
doctrine is therefore flexible enough to accommodate local needs while still 
promoting uniformity and expertise when the state does regulate. 
Conclusion 
Fracking is a risky process that has generated considerable publicity and 
fear. It has also prompted many regulatory efforts. While preemption 
doctrine has guided the fight between states and localities over fracking 
regulation, this doctrine has failed to limit courts’ discretion. Courts should 
therefore abandon preemption doctrine and look instead to principles of 
administrative deference to resolve disputes between state and local 
governments. By adopting these principles, courts will facilitate better 
regulations, increased certainty, and decisions based on expert evaluations of 
emerging facts. 
 
